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The United Nations Convention on Corruption: Making a Real Difference to the 
Quality of Life of Millions? 
 
Indira Carr1 
Abstract 
It is now a year since the UN Convention on Corruption, 2003 came into force.  The 
Convention has received well over sixty ratifications or accessions.  Most of these are 
from countries in the developing world.  This article consisting of three parts addresses 
the following.  Are there any special features in the UN Convention that make it unique 
in advancing the fight against corruption that also contribute to its popularity?  Will this 
convention make a difference in achieving a less corrupt world?  Part I uses a table to 
provide both a bird’s eye view of the other anti-corruption conventions and a reference 
point for comparison when examining the UN Convention.  Part II addresses the issue of 
the popularity of the UN Convention by exploring critically its scope and innovative 
provisions against the historical setting of corruption specific regional and international 
conventions in Part I.  Part II is divided into the following sections: offences, 
investigation and other procedural aspects, asset recovery, sanctions and implementation 
and concludes with a section entitled “Popularity Assessed” which deals with the main 
reasons for its wide adoption.   Part III places the UN Convention in the broader context 
of the limits of criminal law and engages critically with the use of preventive measures as 
envisaged by the UN Convention.  
 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law, Middlesex University; Honorary Visiting Professor, University of Exeter. I would like 
to thank Professors Bob Lee and Ken Peattie of BRASS (Cardiff University). They made it possible for me 
to spend much needed time at BRASS to carry on with my research into corruption in the business 
environment. 
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Introduction 
The media often carry news items of alleged transnational corruption involving huge 
corporations and public officials in the host country.  In 2002, for instance, Thames 
Water, Britain's biggest water company, was asked to renegotiate a contract to operate an 
$891m2 Turkish water plant due to alleged irregularities in the commissioning of the 
plant. A number of Turkish government officials were also investigated for misconduct in 
approving a government guarantee for the project.  Wide publicity of such cases however 
has not seen a reduction in allegations of grand corruption.3  In 2005 the British Serious 
Fraud Office started investigating4 an electricity trading enterprise, EFT, headquartered in 
London, for alleged corruption in the Balkans as a result of special audits commissioned 
by the United Nation’s High Representative in Bosnia.  The allegation was that 
kickbacks5 may have been solicited by officials of a state owned power company to write 
advantageous electricity-swap contracts with private companies and that US government 
aid of $11m for providing electricity to war-torn states in the region was diverted to 
offshore accounts.6  
                                                 
2 All references to $ in this paper are to US Dollars unless otherwise indicated. 
3 For some recent allegations see I. Simensen, ‘Volkert Arrested over VW Bribery Scandal’, Financial 
Times, 21 November 2006; D Leigh and R Evans, ‘BAE Secret Millions Linked to Arms Broker’ The 
Guardian 29 November 2006. See also ‘Siemens Bribery Probe could Sink Nokia Merger’ 9 December 
2006, available at http://uk.news.yahoo.com.  
4 This was made possible due to clarification of UK law relating to the bribery of foreign public officials by 
UK nationals or companies as a result of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 which came into 
force on 14 February 2002.  
5 Part of an income paid to a person having influence over the size or payment of the income – especially 
by some illegal arrangement. 
6 See D. Leigh and R. Evans, 'Fraud Office looks into British energy firm's role in Balkans Company' The 
Guardian 26 February 2005; D. Leigh and R Evans, 'Firm loses fight to block corruption inquiry' The 
Guardian , 23 July 23 2005. 
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Corruption is not a modern phenomenon and multinational corporations and other 
types of business entities,7  Western interests and globalisation are not entirely to blame 
for introducing corrupt practices though there may be some truth in the view that foreign 
investors may be responsible in part for the rapid spread of grand corruption8 in 
developing countries9 where public sector employees are paid extremely low wages.10  
Corruption in its many guises such as bribes, cronyism and nepotism is as old as 
humanity and has affected and moulded social relations and power structures across 
cultures and centuries.  In modern times transnational corruption caught the eye of the 
policymakers in the 1970s when the US Securities and Exchange Commission found that 
more than 400 US based companies had made illegal payments of well over $300 
million11 to foreign government officials and political parties to ensure the facilitation of 
trade.  This resulted in the US passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977.  
Nothing happened by way of international legislative initiatives between the 1970s and 
1990s.  What is unique about the mid-1990s onwards is that governments and 
international bodies are willing to openly talk about the problem and its effects on the 
                                                 
7 Openness to international trade is often seen as a contributor to high levels of corruption especially in 
countries where there are complex bureaucratic structures. See Hors, ‘Fighting Corruption on Customs 
Administration: What can we Learn from Recent Experiences’ Technical Paper 175, (Paris: OECD 2001). 
Also see Krugman ‘Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences’ Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity. (1975). 
8 This refers to corruption at the highest levels including the corruption within the government. 
9 Petty corruption is a common phenomenon in developing countries, many of them ex-colonies. It takes 
the form of small bribes or gifts for obtaining necessary documentation such as a motor licence (tax disc) or 
driving licence and obtaining connection to basic utilities such as electricity and water. 
10 See S. Alatas, Corruption, Its Nature, Causes and Functions  (Aldershot: Brookfield 1990); Mbaku 
‘Africa after more than Thirty Years of Independence: Still Poor and Deprived’, 11 Journal of Third World 
Studies (1994), 13; D. Gould and Mukendi, ‘Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and 
Remedies’, 12 International Journal of Public Administration (1989), 427; ‘Eliminating World Poverty: 
Making Globalisation Work for the Poor’, Cmnd 5006, (London: HMSO 2000); S. Rose-Ackermann, ‘The 
Economics of Corruption’ 4 Journal of Public Economics (1975), 187; C.W. Gray and D. Kaufmann, 
‘Corruption and Development’, 35 Finance and Development (1998), 7; V. Tanzi, ‘Corruption Around the 
World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures’  45 IMF Staff Papers. (1998), 559. 
11 According to a recent report from the US Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, the problem of 
corruption is still a major issue in the United States. They estimate that corruption and fraud claims are 
more than $700 millions a year in the US. 
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quality of life for millions of people around the world and think of ways of combating 
such practices rather than treating corruption as a taboo subject.12  Tackling corruption 
has now taken the centre stage on the policy making agenda of influential international 
economic institutions such as the World Bank13 and the International Monetary Fund.  
Coupled with the pioneering work of the civil society organisation, Transparency 
International,14 this has further quickened the pace of policy makers to combat 
corruption.  Often described as a cancer affecting development and poverty reduction 
globally, regional and international institutions have worked over the last decade to 
produce suitable legislative instruments in the form of conventions for adoption by 
countries.  
The use of international conventions as a tool for harmonising law in specific areas 
is nothing new.  Of course, the success rates of conventions in terms of the number of 
ratifications or accessions coming into force and implementation vary wildly.  A 
convention, be it regional or international, is a product of compromise and consensus 
driven at times by a number of stakeholders such as politicians, commerce, industry and 
                                                 
12 Of course, it is possible to view this unwillingness to do anything substantial pre-1990s cynically as a 
means of protecting Western economic interests. Equally, the current frenzy towards adopting anti-
corruption measures can be viewed as a means of protecting Western economic interests by ensuring that 
industries from newly emerging economies such as China and India do not obtain a competitive advantage 
in the global market as a result of engaging in corrupt practices. As it is, low labour cost in manufacturing 
industries in these countries to some extent is affecting the competitiveness of Western economic interests. 
13 According to the World Bank, the cost of corruption globally stands around $1000 billions. While the 
World Bank regularly raised concerns regarding corruption with its donees, it was only in 1996 that it 
announced its commitment to “fighting the cancer of corruption”. At the Ninth International Anti-
Corruption Conference, Mr Wolfensohn of the World Bank made their serious concerns known: 
So far as our institution is concerned there is nothing more important than the issue of corruption 
… At the core of the incidence of poverty is the issue of equity, at the core of the issue of equity is 
the issue of corruption. Corruption has to be dealt with by a combination of forces within the 
country … the best we could do was to try and assist in the building of the coalitions and in the 
forging of that interest in the issue of corruption and inequity, and get it out there. 
See http://www.worldbank.org. The World Bank describes its approach as a multi-pronged approach. See 
‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank since 1997’, (Washington: World 
Bank 2000).  
14 Transparency International reports are available at www.ti.org.  
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civil society.  During this process, legal principles familiar to a legal tradition may be 
replaced with unfamiliar principles imported from another legal tradition and this taken 
along with the responses of various stakeholders and lobby groups within that nation can 
affect a nation’s decision to ratify or not ratify a convention.15  Even were a convention 
to be ratified, it may not be implemented by a State for a number of reasons, some 
methodological and others associated with sensitive issues related to politics and 
sovereignty.  For instance, the instrument may be viewed by developing countries simply 
as a tool to promote the interests of Western (i.e. developed) economies,16 and their 
decision to ratify may simply be a diplomatic exercise rather than a serious commitment 
to the policies embedded in the conventions. 
Against this broad context, it is a surprise that the subject of this article, the United 
Nations Convention on Corruption (hereinafter “UN Convention”) adopted in December 
2003,17 came into force in December 2005, and currently has well over 60 ratifications18 
                                                 
15 For instance, the United Kingdom is yet to ratify the Convention on the International Sale of Goods 1980 
(“Vienna Convention”) which has been ratified by most of the Member States of the European Union. Its 
reluctance in part stems from the view that English law on the sale of goods serves its purposes well and 
that the Vienna Convention is unlikely to produce uniformity. See Law Reform Committee of the Council, 
1980 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (London: Law Society of England and 
Wales 1981). According to A Rossett, the Vienna Convention is “a cut-and-paste job, and the primary 
operative principle was to produce a document that all could agree to and none would reject”. ‘CISG Laid 
Bare: A Lucid Guide to a Muddy Code’, 12(3) Cornell International Law Journal (1988), 575 at 589. 
16 For instance, many of the developing countries saw the Hague-Visby Rules (International Convention for 
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading as amended by the Brussels Protocol) as a 
convention largely in favour of ship-owning interests of developed nations. See Report of the UNCTAD 
Secretariat on Bills of Lading UN Doc E72 IID2, 1971.  
17 This convention came into being as a result of discussions in the UN Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice (see E/CN.15/1998/11). The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
in Articles 8 and 9 requires basic anti-corruption measures, but it was felt that corruption required a 
separate convention. After due consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee work on the anti-corruption 
convention was started. 
18 The Convention came into force on 14 December 2005. So far the following ratifications or accessions 
have taken place: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chile, China, Congo, Croatia, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Honduras, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, 
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or accessions.  It seems that this Convention is well on its way to being a success, since it 
has met two of the three criteria mentioned above: it is in force and has a great number of 
ratifications and may be moving rapidly towards the third criterion, notably, 
implementation.  This of itself raises some interesting questions: 
• Are there any special features in the UN Convention that make it unique in 
advancing the fight against corruption? 
•  What are reasons for its popularity?  
• Will this convention make a difference in achieving a less corrupted world?  
This article consisting of three parts addresses these questions.  Part I uses a table to 
provide both a bird’s eye view of the other anti-corruption conventions and a reference 
point for comparison when examining the UN Convention.  Part II addresses the issue of 
the popularity of the UN Convention by exploring critically its scope and innovative 
provisions against the historical setting of regional and international conventions on 
corruption mentioned in Part I.  Part II is divided into the following sections: offences, 
investigation and other procedural aspects, asset recovery, sanctions and implementation. 
Then, it concludes with a section entitled “Popularity Assessed” which deals with the 
main reasons for its wide adoption.  Part III places the UN Convention in the broader 
context of the limits of criminal law and engages critically with the use of preventive 
measures as envisaged by the UN Convention.  
1. Bird’s Eye View of Anti-Corruption Conventions (Excluding the UN Convention) 
Most countries have some form of legislation to combat corruption at the domestic level.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
United Republic of Tanzania, and Yemen. 
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The extent of regulation across countries however is not uniform and this is where 
international conventions19 come into their own.  They play an important role in unifying 
to some extent the law across countries, especially where the activity has taken on a 
global character.  The applicability of a State’s domestic law to offences committed 
outside its jurisdiction, for instance, was an area of ambiguity even in developed 
countries that had a heightened awareness of the conduct of their businesses abroad.  
Countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada, until recently, did not have any 
clear provisions relating to cross border corruption when their nationals were involved in 
the corruption of a foreign public official.  It was very much a question of speculation as 
to whether or not their courts had jurisdiction over corrupt acts committed abroad by their 
nationals.20  In the UK, anti-corruption law was spread across two sources, common law 
and a number of statutes, notably, the Public Bodies Corrupt Act 188921, the Prevention 
of Corruption Act 1906 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916. The law covered both 
active and passive bribery22’23, and applied to both private and public sector bribery24.  
Ratification of the OECD25 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Official 
in International Business Transactions, 1997 (hereinafter “OECD Convention”) 26 and its 
                                                 
19 Full unification remains largely an ideal and perhaps is an impossible goal since policy perspectives and 
priorities guided by social and cultural needs vary between countries.  
20 In Canada, for instance, the case of R v Libman [1985] SCR 178 which dealt with the application of 
conspiracy provisions extraterritorially gave rise to substantial debates as to whether Canadian criminal law 
was sufficient to cope with corruption of foreign public official by their nationals. See J.M. Klotz, ‘Bribery 
of Foreign Officials – A Call for Change in the Law of Canada’, 73 Canadian Bar Review (1994), 467.  
21 The definition of public body in the 1889 Act was widened by the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, so 
that local and public authorities of all descriptions could be included. 
22 Active bribery refers to the promise or giving of the bribe, and passive bribery refers to the taking or 
solicitation of the bribe.  
23 The Public Bodies Corrupt Act 1889.  
24 The Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.  
25 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
26 The Convention came into force on 15 February 1999, and has received ratifications or accessions from 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
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implementation by the UK has now established in clear terms that UK has jurisdiction 
over bribery of foreign public officials by their nationals.27  Similarly, in Canada its 
Criminal Code dealt with bribery of government officers and judicial officers, but not 
with the bribery of foreign public officials.28  That position has changed substantially 
now with the implementation of the OECD Convention through the enactment of the 
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act 1998.29 
The above illustration establishes the contribution of conventions to modernizing 
domestic law and harmonizing different national laws.  Besides the OECD Convention, 
there are a number of other anti-corruption conventions, all of which are regional. These 
are:  
                                                                                                                                                 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. 
27 s.108 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 introduced the foreign element into the 
common law offence of bribery and, amended s.1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, s.4(2) of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, and s.7 of the Public Bodies Corrupt Act 1889. In March 2003, as a 
result of dissatisfaction expressed by the Law Commission with the complex and obscure state of 
corruption law, the Home Office published a draft Corruption Bill (hereinafter ‘‘the Bill’’) intended to 
provide a comprehensive statute on corruption and repeal the common law offence of bribery, the Public 
Bodies Corrupt Act 1889, parts of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and s. 4(2) of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1916. The Bill includes a definition of ‘‘what acting corruptly actually means’’, and bases 
its analysis on a conception of corruption as a lack of loyalty between principal and agent. For instance, cl.3 
states that ‘‘a person commits an offence if he performs his functions as an agent corruptly.’’ and the 
meaning of agent is provided in cl.11. The Bill creates in its first three clauses three offences—corruptly 
conferring an advantage, corruptly obtaining an advantage, and performing functions corruptly. The issue 
of what acting corruptly means is to be gathered from cll.5, 6 and 7 which delineate the circumstances in 
which it could occur. See Cmnd 5777 (2003), text is available at www.hmso.gov.uk. Also see Hansard 
Debates (HL) 16 July 2004, col.1554.  The Bill was criticized by an All Party Committee of both Houses. 
A consultation process was commenced in December 2005. For more on the principal-agent model, see N. 
Groenendijk, ‘A Principal Agent Model of Corruption’, 27 Crime, Law and Social Change (1997), 207. In 
May 2006, Hugh Bayley, MP introduced a new Corruption Bill (Bill 185 (2005-2006) London: HMSO) 
under the ten minute rule. Transparency International played a substantial role in the drafting of this bill. 
For more on this see http://www.transparency.org.uk. 
28 See J.G. Castel, Extraterritoriality in International Trade: Canada and United States of America 
Practices Compared, (Toronto: Butterworths 1988).  
29 S.C. 1998, c.34.  
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i) The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 1996 (hereinafter “OAS 
Convention”) of the Organisation of American States30 
ii) The Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on 
European Union on the Fight Against Corruption involving Officials of the 
European Union Communities or Officials of Member States of the European 
Union 1999 (hereinafter “EU Convention”)31 
iii) The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999 
(hereinafter “COE Convention”)32 
iv) The Southern African Development Protocol Against Corruption 2001 
(hereinafter “SADC Protocol”)33 
v) The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
2003 (hereinafter “AU Convention”);34 
vi) The Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention 
on Corruption 2003 (hereinafter “COE Protocol”) 
                                                 
30 The OAS Convention came into force on 6 March 1997, and the following countries have ratified or 
acceded to it: Argentina, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas (Commonwealth), Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St Kitts & Nevis, St 
Lucia, St Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
31 The EU Convention is still in the process of receiving ratifications. See also Council Framework 
Decision 2003.568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector (OJ L 192 of 
31.07.2003). According to Article 249 of the EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam a decision 
is binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.  
32 The COE Convention came into force on 1 July 2002, and has received ratifications from Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, and United Kingdom. 
33 The SADC Protocol is not yet in force. So far the following countries have ratified the Protocol: 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
34 The AU Convention came into force on 5 August 2006. It has been ratified by Algeria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Comoros, Congo Libya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Tanzania and Uganda. 
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The features of the above conventions inevitably vary and some of these including 
those of the OECD are set out below in a tabular form for ease of comparison.  The 
intention is not to give a detailed account of the conventions but to provide a bird’s eye 
view of the different approaches to corruption through the creation of criminal offences, 
sanctions, corporate liability, money laundering, bank secrecy, extradition, mutual legal 
assistance and international co-operation, seizure, freezing, and confiscation and 
monitoring of implementation.  References will be made to Table I while examining the 
innovative features of the UN Convention in Part II.  In the first column, there are 
substantive, procedural and other provisions against which the articles dealing with the 
specific subject-matter from six different conventions are listed in columns 2 – 6.  
Clarification of terms like ‘public official’ are also included where required.  Shaded 
boxes against the subject matter indicate that that particular matter is not addressed by the 
convention under consideration. 
Table I: Features of the Anti-Corruption Conventions (OAS Convention, OECD Convention, COE 
Convention & Protocol, SADC Protocol, AU Convention and EU Convention) 
© Indira Carr, 2006. 
 
Substantive,  Procedural 
and Other Provisions  
OAS Convention OECD Convention COE 
Convention & 
Protocol 
SADC 
Protocol 
AU 
Convention 
EU Convention 
 Active bribery of 
domestic public official 
Art VII(1)b 
‘Public official’, 
‘government official’, 
‘public servant’ 
construed widely to 
include those who 
have been selected, 
 
 
 
Art 2 
(Note that 
offences in 
COE 
Convention are 
couched in 
mandatory 
Art 3(b) 
‘Public official’ 
widely 
construed to 
include those 
in employment 
of state, its 
Art 4(b) 
‘Public 
official’ 
construed 
as official or 
employee 
of State or 
Art 3 ‘Official’ 
construed as   
Community or 
national official 
including national 
official of another 
Member State. 
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appointed or elected 
to perform activities 
or functions in the 
name of the State at 
any level of its 
hierarchy (Art I). 
 
 
terms with the 
use of the 
phrase ‘shall 
adopt’.) 
agencies, 
legislative, 
executive and 
judicial 
branch.  
its agencies 
who have 
been 
elected, 
selected or 
appointed 
to perform 
functions in 
the name of 
the State. 
 
 
‘National official’ is 
construed in terms 
of an official or 
public officer as 
defined in the 
national law of  
each Member State
for the purposes of 
its own criminal  
law. See also Art 4 
on assimilation.  
Substantive, Procedural 
and Other Provisions  
OAS Convention OECD Convention COE 
Convention & 
Protocol 
SADC 
Protocol 
AU 
Convention 
EU Convention 
Passive bribery of 
domestic public official 
Art VI(1)(a)  Art 3 Art 3(a) Art 4(a) Art 2. (See 
definition above.) 
Passive bribery of 
foreign public official 
  Art 5    
Active bribery of foreign 
public official 
Art VIII Art 1 but restricted 
to international 
business 
transactions. 
No definition of 
international 
business 
transaction but 
Preamble states 
that it is to include 
trade and 
investment. 
 
Art 5 Art 6   
Bribery of members of 
foreign public 
assemblies; 
Debatable. See 
above on definition of 
‘public official’ but 
‘Foreign public 
official’ is 
construed widely in 
Arts 6, 9, 10 & 
11 (Cover both 
active and 
See Arts 6 & 
1. 
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officials of international 
organisations; 
members of international 
parliamentary 
assemblies; judges and 
official of International 
Courts 
 
 
unlikely to include 
officials of 
international 
organisations. 
Art 1(4) to mean 
any person holding 
a legislative, 
administrative or 
judicial office of a 
foreign country, 
whether elected or 
appointed; any 
person exercising 
a public function, 
and any official of 
a public 
international 
organisation. 
‘Foreign country’ 
includes all levels 
of government, 
from national to 
local.  
passive 
bribery) 
Active bribery in private 
sector 
  Art 7 Art 3(e) Art 11  
Passive bribery in private 
sector 
  Art 8 As above. Art 11  
Substantive,  Procedural 
and Other Provisions  
OAS Convention OECD Convention COE 
Convention & 
Protocol 
SADC 
Protocol 
AU 
Convention 
EU Convention 
Active and passive 
bribery of domestic 
arbitrators  
Debatable. See 
definition of ‘public 
official’ above. 
 Arts 2 & 3 of 
Protocol 
Not mentioned 
but likely to 
fall within 
definition of 
public official. 
Not 
mentioned 
but likely to 
fall within 
definition of 
public 
official. 
 
Active bribery of foreign 
arbitrators 
Debatable.  Art 4 of 
Protocol 
See above. See above.  
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Bribery of domestic 
jurors 
Debatable. See 
definition of ‘public 
official’ above.  
 Art 5 of 
Protocol 
See above 
(Debatable) 
See above 
(Debatable) 
 
Bribery of foreign jurors See definition of 
‘public official’ above. 
 Art 6 of 
Protocol 
See above 
(Debatable) 
  
 Illicit enrichment Art IX 
A controversial 
provision due to 
reversal of burden of 
proof.   
   Art 8  
Diversion of monies, 
securities, property etc 
for purposes unrelated to 
those for which they 
were intended by public 
official for own/third 
party benefit.  
See Art XI(1)(b)   Art 3(d) Art 4(d)   
Omission/act in 
discharge of duties by 
public official for illicitly 
obtaining benefit for 
himself/third party 
Art VI (1)(c)   Art 3(c) Art 4(c)  
Trading in Influence   Art 12 Art 3(f) Covers 
both public 
and private 
sectors. 
Art 4(f)  
Fraudulent 
Use/Concealment of  
Property Derived through 
Corruption Offences 
Art VI(1)(d)   Art 8(g) Art 4(b)  
 
 
 
Transparency in Funding 
of Political Parties 
 
 
 
 
   Art 10  
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Substantive,  Procedural 
and Other Provisions  
OAS Convention OECD Convention COE 
Convention & 
Protocol 
SADC 
Protocol 
AU 
Convention 
EU Convention 
Participatory Acts as 
principal, co-principal, 
instigator, accomplice or 
accessory  
Art VI(1)(e) Art 1(2) Art 15 Art 3(h) Art 4(i)  
Accounting Offences  Art 8  Art 14    
Corporate Liability   Art 2. Art 18 Legal 
person can be 
held liable for 
active bribery, 
trading in 
influence and 
money 
laundering. 
 See Art 
11(3). 
Art 6 Heads of 
businesses or 
persons having 
power over 
decision-making 
may be criminally 
liable in respect of 
Art 3 offences. 
Tax Deductibility of 
Expenses 
Art III (6) See Para IV 
Revised 
Recommendation 
DAFFE/IME/BR 
(97) 20. 
 Art 4   
Bank Secrecy  Art XVI  Art 23 Art 8 Art 17  
Seizure & Confiscation Art XV  Art 23 Art 8 Art 16  
Laundering of Proceeds  Art 7 Art 13  Art 6  
Sanctions  Art 3 To be 
effective, 
proportionate and 
dissuasive. 
Art 19 To be 
effective, 
proportionate 
and dissuasive. 
  Art 5 To be 
effective, 
proportionate and 
dissuasive. 
Protection for Informers, 
Witnesses 
Art III (8) 
 
 
 
 Art 22 Art 4 Art 5  
Sanctions for Malicious 
Informers 
 
 
  Art 4 Art 5  
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Mutual Legal Assistance  Art XIV 
 
Art 9 Arts 21, 23,  26 Art 10 Art 18 Art 9 
International Co-
operation 
Art XIV See Para VII 
Revised 
Recommendation 
DAFFE/IME/BR 
(97) 20. 
Art 25  Art 19  
Extradition Art XIII 
 
 
 
 
Art 10 Art 27 Art 9 Art 15 Art 8 
Substantive,  Procedural 
and Other Provisions  
OAS Convention OECD Convention COE 
Convention & 
Protocol 
SADC 
Protocol 
AU 
Convention 
EU Convention 
Preventive Measures Art III Standards of 
Conduct for public 
officials; declaration 
of assets, 
transparent systems 
for government 
procurement, 
maintenance of 
books and records, 
participation of 
NGOs. 
  Art 4 
Participation 
of media, civil 
society, 
NGOs, public 
education, 
transparent 
systems in 
government 
hiring, 
procurement. 
Code of 
conduct for 
public officials.  
Art 12 
Participatio
n of civil 
society, 
media. 
 
Monitoring and Follow-
Up of Implementation 
No follow-up 
mechanism in 
Convention but 
system set up after 
The Declaration of 
Mar del Plata.  There 
Art 12 Conducted 
in two phases. 
Art 24 Group of 
States Against 
Corruption 
(GRECO) to 
monitor. 
Art 11  
Committee 
consisting of 
States Parties 
to carry put 
process. 
Art 22 
Advisory 
Board to 
encourage 
adoption on 
Convention 
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is now an established 
implementation and 
follow-up mechanism 
that adopts a peer 
review process. 
and 
develop 
harmonised 
codes of 
conduct. 
 
As is apparent from Table I above, not all the conventions address corruption in all 
sectors or aspects that affect the investigation of corruption such as protection of 
witnesses.  Conventions drafted later in chronological terms have tended to move towards 
a more comprehensive approach.  Perhaps the most comprehensive amongst the regional 
conventions are the COE Convention and the AU Convention, though they too have their 
omissions, for instance, the AU Convention does not deal with corruption of a foreign 
public official and the COE Convention with funding of political parties.  What is 
noticeable when it comes to the UN Convention is that it seems to have given an in-depth 
consideration to corruption in its various forms alongside important issues of 
investigation, asset recovery and preventive measure thus imparting a sense of a well-
rounded convention.  This multi-pronged approach is likely to have contributed to its 
popularity.  However whether it has gone far enough is a matter that will be raised as and 
where appropriate in the next part.  
2. The UN Convention35  
The UN Convention has often been described by organisations such as Transparency 
International as a comprehensive document.  The Convention lends itself easily to this 
description since 
                                                 
35 The UN Convention consists of eight chapters, Chapter I (General Provisions); Chapter II (Preventive 
Measures); Chapter III (Criminalization and Law Enforcement); Chapter IV (International Co-operation); 
Chapter V (Asset Recovery); Chapter VI (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange); Chapter VII 
(Mechanisms for Implementation) and Chapter VIII (Final Provisions). The text of the Convention is 
available at http://www.un.org.             
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• it creates an extensive list of corruption and corruption-related offences; 
• it addresses the difficult issue of asset recovery by devoting an entire chapter 
(Chapter V) to it;  
• it vigorously promotes international co-operation, technical assistance and 
information exchange; and 
• it includes novel provisions on preventive measures. 
2.1 Offences 
The UN Convention is not different from the other conventions listed in Table I above in 
targeting specific acts of corruption and related offences and casts its net widely like the 
AU Convention.36  The language of the UN Convention varies from the mandatory to the 
discretionary, from ‘shall adopt’ to ‘shall consider adopting’, thus indicating that the 
States Parties (hereinafter “SPs”) in some cases have a degree of flexibility.  This 
linguistic usage is also found in the creation of offences and on the basis of this 
distinction the offences are set out under what I call for convenience sake “List A” and 
“List B”: the former covering offences of a mandatory character, the latter offences that 
include an element of choice. 
2.1.1 List A 
The most common form of corruption is bribery, involving a mutual exchange between X 
(the bribe giver) and Y (the bribe taker) where Y does or refrains from doing something 
in return for something from X.  The advantages promised to Y directly or indirectly in 
this mutual exchange situation need not always be of a monetary kind; neither need it be 
directed at Y.  It can be one of kind, for instance, hospital treatment for an elderly relative 
                                                 
36 See Table I. 
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or luxury holidays to be enjoyed by third parties.  Article 15 focuses on passive and 
active bribery of domestic public officials37 and requires SPs to adopt legislative 
measures to make them criminal offences when committed intentionally.  Article 16 
extends the bribery offence to active bribery of a foreign public official and officials of 
public international organisations when committed intentionally.  In drafting these 
offences, it mimics, to some extent, the language found in other anti-corruption 
conventions. 
The next offence to fall within this list is embezzlement, misappropriation or 
diversion of property by a public official.38  Existing laws on theft in many SPs are likely 
to cover this type of behaviour but it was felt that this should be specifically included 
within the list of corruption offences for a number of reasons: first, theft has a broad 
meaning and second, in some jurisdictions it may refer only to theft of tangibles.  The 
kinds of activities that seem to be contemplated by Article 17 are the use of government 
funds for improvements to personal real estates, unauthorized withdrawals from 
government accounts or false expense claims.39  
Laundering of proceeds of  crime also seems to fall within List A and SPs are 
required to establish as criminal offences  the conversion, concealment, disposition, 
                                                 
37 ‘Public official’ is widely construed to include any person holding a legislative, executive and 
administrative or judicial official of a State Party. They can be elected or appointed, permanent or 
temporary post-holders, paid or unpaid members. It also includes those who perform a public function in a 
public agency or public enterprise, and also those defined as a ‘public official’ in the domestic law of the 
State Party. (Article 2(a)). 
38 Article 17. 
39 The Toolkit produced by the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) cites as an example 
the use of World Bank-funded vehicles for taking children of public officials to schools. See Part I of 
‘Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption’ available 
at http://www.unodc.org. 
Indira Carr                                             MJIEL Vol 3 Issue 3 2006 
 
 21
movement or ownership of property when committed intentionally and knowing that such 
property is proceeds of crime.40        
Obstruction of justice is another offence created by the UN Convention.  Under 
Article 25, SPs have to make the use of physical force, intimidation against members of 
the public, judicial and enforcement officers, or interference in the giving of testimony an 
offence when committed intentionally.41  This is an unusual provision in a corruption 
convention but its inclusion is to strengthen the investigation and prosecution processes 
when a case of corruption is alleged.  
Participatory acts in any capacity such as that of an instigator, accomplice or 
assistant are also made a criminal offence.42  Since companies participate in illegal 
activities, Article 26 expects SPs to adopt measures to establish the liability of legal 
persons.  The liability of these legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.  
Liability of the legal person does not, however, affect the liability of natural persons. 
Intention as is to be expected forms the backbone for the committing of an offence 
under the UN Convention.  It is the first anti-corruption convention to indicate how 
intentionality is to be construed thus doing away with potential debates on whether the 
subjective or objective test is to be applied.  According to Article 28, “knowledge, intent 
or purpose required as an element of offence established in accordance with the 
Convention may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.”  
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Article 27. 
41 Article 25. 
42 Article 27 
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2.1.2. List B. 
The UN Convention like the COE Convention43 includes bribery in the private sector but 
under the discretionary list.  Its exclusion from List A is a surprise given that (1) 
multinational corporations now are as powerful in economic terms as some of the small 
nation states, and (2) many developing countries have privatized the provision of utilities 
such as electricity and water which were normally provided by the public sector.  Europe 
argued strongly for including the private sector but faced major resistance from the US 
who did not want to see the private sector included in the UN Convention at all on the 
basis that “many practices viewed as corrupt in the government aren’t improper in 
business”.44  In the end, by way of compromise, the UN Convention requires SPs to 
consider the adoption of legislative measures that may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offences, passive and active bribery and embezzlement of property when 
committed intentionally in the private sector.  This leaves it open to the SPs to act as they 
see fit.45  
A striking inclusion within List B is passive bribery of foreign public officials or an 
official of a public international organisation in Article 16(b).  While it is easy to see how 
it might be applied to an official working with an international organisation, for instance, 
an official of UNESCO located within the State that has implemented Article 16(b), it is 
difficult to see how it could extend to the act of a foreign public official located in 
another State unless the said act takes place within the implementing State. 
                                                 
43 See Table I. 
44 B. Dabis ‘US Battles Europe to Narrow a Treaty Banning Corruption’, The Wall Street Journal, 17 June 
2003. The argument was that in many cultures the giving of expensive gifts to those working within the 
private sector would not be seen as a ‘bribe’. 
45 Articles 21 and 22. 
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Abuse of functions46 by a public official is another offence introduced by the UN 
Convention.  It moves away from the idea of mutual exchange present in the offence of 
bribery and refers to intentionally acting or omitting to act in violation of the law for the 
purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or a third party.  The emphasis of 
this provision is on the quality of the act of the public official and the consequences that 
flow from it.  So if an official were to use information gained from perusing sensitive and 
privileged documents and, contrary to confidentiality laws, uses the information to gain 
some advantage for himself or a third party, then an offence would be committed under 
this section as long as it is committed intentionally.  Though somewhat differently 
worded, the AU Convention also contains a provision that is intended to have the same 
result.47 
 Another offence included within this list is that of illicit enrichment which has 
proved highly controversial in the context of other conventions, in particular, the OAS 
Convention and the AU Convention.48  For instance, the US in respect of illicit 
enrichment (Article IX) offence in the OAS Convention said it is contrary to the legal 
principles of the US legal system, since it reverses the burden of proof.  Article 20 of the 
UN Convention also seems to place the obligation on the public official to give a 
reasonable explanation for substantial increase of his assets.  The UN Convention, 
however, does go on to state that this provision is subject to the constitution and the 
fundamental principles of the SPs legal system.  This offence does give one major 
advantage to inexperienced investigation authorities however.  In placing the onus on the 
accused, all that the authorities have to show is a substantial increase in the wealth of the 
                                                 
46 Article 19. 
47 See Article4 (c). 
48 See Table I. 
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public official under scrutiny.  The illicit enrichment offence certainly has been 
implemented  by the South American states that have ratified the OAS Convention, many 
of whom lack the expertise and availability of personnel required for complex 
investigations.49  
Trading in influence, be it passive or active, is made a criminal offence under 
Article 20.  This offence is also to be found in other conventions.50  It is intended to cover 
situations where for instance a public official or a person offers his services to influence 
the decision making process in return for an undue advantage.  It does not matter whether 
the supposed influence leads to the intended result or not for the purposes of this offence.  
There is a reason to believe that such phenomena are fairly common in corridors of power 
in many developing countries. 
Lastly, attempt to commit an offence and preparation for an offence established 
under the Convention51 appears in the discretionary list whereas participation appears as a 
mandatory offence.  The reason for this may lie in differences between national laws.  
What is also striking about the UN Convention is that it replicates the general 
approach to be found in the other anti-corruption conventions preceding it, and restricts 
itself to improper behaviour that affects the decision making processes and involves 
economic gain in the context of (1) private sector to the public sector as, for instance, 
when an individual or a company engages in corrupt behaviour with a public official and 
(2) private sector to private sector as, for instance, when a sales person of one company 
bribes a procurement manager of another company.  However, improper exchanges 
                                                 
49 In adopting Art IX of the OAS Convention a State may be in breach of its obligations under a regional or 
global human rights treaty to which it is a party. 
50 See Table I (AU Convention). 
51 Article 27 (2) and (3). 
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where there is an effect on the decision-making process are to be found in other contexts 
and are likely to be viewed as corrupt though not corrupt under any of the anti-corruption 
conventions.  For example, within the public sector public officials may engage in some 
form of illicit exchange which does not involve economic or monetary gain for the 
officials concerned or a third party, but may have long term benefits for the department in 
which the public official works.52  For instance, a request from a senior public official 
from the police department to a senior official of the auditing and statistics department to 
massage the crime figures with the intention of receiving more resources is likely to be 
perceived as corruption.  It results in public deceit and also deceit of various state actors 
involved in policy making processes such as resource allocation and so on.  Since this 
type of behaviour lacks personal advantage of an economic nature, it is not caught by the 
anti-corruption conventions.  
2.2. Investigation and other Procedural Aspects  
The UN Convention, like the other anti-corruption conventions, will suffer from an 
enforcement deficit.  Part of the reason for this is the covert nature of the crime along 
with the difficulties associated in the investigation of such crimes.  Successful 
investigation and prosecution are dependent on information provided by affected 
individuals or others who work alongside corrupt individuals.  People are unlikely to 
come forward as informers or as witnesses if they are likely to face external pressures 
such as intimidation and threats.  Provision is made in Article 33 of the UN Convention 
which requires SPs to ensure that there are appropriate measures to provide protection 
against any unjustified treatment for a person who reports in good faith and on reasonable 
                                                 
52 See S. Chibnall and P. Sanders, ‘World Apart: Notes on the Social Reality of Corruption’, 2 British 
Journal of Sociology (1977), 138.  
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grounds to the competent authorities.  Such informants, often termed whistleblowers,53 
are the subject of legal protection in many countries.54  The purpose of such legislation is 
to ensure that whistleblowers are protected from reprisals at their workplace and that such 
protection will enable disclosure of information.  The ambit of the legislation varies from 
country to country.  While some restrict protection of whistleblowers to the public 
sector,55 others have included both the public and private sector within the scope of such 
protection.56  There are also variations amongst national legislations on who is protected 
(e.g. a public official, an employee),  what disclosures qualify for protection (e.g. breach 
of health and safety regulations, breach of environmental regulations, criminal offences 
committed or about to be committed), to whom they should be reported (e.g. ombudsman, 
Auditor General, employer at the first instance), and the level of belief on the 
whistleblower’s part in respect of the illegal activity (e.g. reasonable grounds of belief or 
strong reasons for suspicion), and how the whistleblower is to be protected from reprisals 
(e.g. relief from liability, anonymous reporting).  As to how effective such legislation is 
in encouraging people with information to come forward is highly debatable.  There are 
no available comparative statistics relating to numbers of complaints about malpractices 
involving whistleblowers within different sectors to assess the success of the legislation.  
                                                 
53 They alert their employers and other authorities regarding illegal activities within an institution such as 
corruption, fraud, false/irregular accounting practices, environmental violations, health and safety 
violations. There are a variety of definitions in respect of whistle-blowing: see Jubb ‘Whistleblowing: A 
Restrictive Definition and Interpretation’, 12(1) Journal of Business Ethics (1999), 77. See also Rothschild 
and Miethe, ‘Whistleblower Disclosures and Management Retaliation’, 26(1) Work and Occupation 
(1999)107. 
54 US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, the UK Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.     
55 For example, Australia – see Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) as amended 1998.  
56 For example, South Africa (Protected Disclosures Acts 2000), UK (Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998), 
New Zealand (Protected Disclosures Act 2000).  
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There is, however, plenty of statistical evidence to suggest that whistleblowers are simply 
victimized by their employers. 57  
The whistleblower’s legislation as currently adopted by jurisdictions is devoted to 
protecting informers from within an entity who expose malpractices within their place of 
employment.  Informers who fall outside of this class also need to be protected, for 
instance a concerned individual who reports on the corrupt activities of his neighbour.  
Article 33 also has these types of informers58 within its sight. 
Protection of experts and witnesses is addressed in Article 32 which requires SPs to 
take appropriate measures for their physical protection including relocation and non-
disclosure of their identity.  In reality, many of the developing countries will not have the 
necessary resources to follow through these guarantees as expressed in legislative 
instruments.  And in countries where corruption is endemic at best such provisions are 
likely to be nothing more than window dressing. 
                                                 
57 See for example M. Glazer, ‘Ten Whistleblowers and How They Fared’, 13 Hasting Ctr Rpt (1983), 33. 
See also A.F. Westin, H.I. Kurtz, A. Robbins (eds) Whistle-blowing: Loyalty and Dissent in the 
Corporation, (New York: McGraw-Hill 1981); P.H. Bucy, ‘Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory 
World’, 39(4) Houston Law Review (2002), 944. 
58 Investigation authorities also recruit and use informers (also known as “informants”, “police sources”) 
but there is limited research on their background and their motivations in imparting information to the 
police. For available research, see D. Rose, In the Name of the Law, (London: Vantage Press 1996); S. 
Greer, Supergrasses: A Study in the Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland, (London: 
Clarendon Press 1995); R. Billingsley, T. Nemitz, and P. Bean,  Informers, (Cullompton, Devon: Willan 
Publishing 2001); D.L. Martin, ‘The Police Role in Wrongful Convictions: An International Comparative 
Study’ in S. Westervelt and J. Humphreys (eds) Wrongfully Convicted: When Justice Fails, (Piscataway, 
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press 2001), in this largely “secretive” policing activity, suggests that most 
of the informers are in some way connected to the criminal fraternity directly or indirectly though there are 
the few who are not. Their motivations vary. Some are tempted by the police reward whilst others may 
divulge information in return for immunity or for a reduction in sentence or for the purposes of protecting 
loved ones from getting involved with the criminal fraternity. Revenge is also cited as a reason for 
providing police with information. And there are those who are driven by moral principles and act for the 
greater good. In most cases there is some sort of exchange between the informer and the informed, be it of 
money, leniency in sentencing or some other favour. It is indeed very difficult to gauge the success of this 
mechanism in the context of corruption. Regardless of various mechanisms that the police may have in 
place in accessing information from “good” sources, the reliability of such information is debatable and 
may result in miscarriages of justice. 
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Investigation is also made the more difficult when documents, key witnesses, and 
other materials are spread across jurisdictions.  This is particularly so when transnational 
corruption is involved.  Even where there is no transnational element, it is likely that 
corruptly obtained assets may have been sent abroad.  The UN Convention seeks to 
promote co-operation both at the domestic and international levels, and in Article 38 
dealing with co-operation at the domestic level, it is expected that public authorities and 
public officials co-operate with the enforcement authorities by providing the necessary 
information that is requested.  Article 38(a) also expects public authorities to act as 
informers where there are reasonable grounds to believe that offences under Articles 15, 
21 and 2359 have been committed.  
Chapter IV headed ‘‘International Co-operation’’ is devoted to co-operation at the 
international level and includes co-operation between law enforcement agencies on a 
number of matters, such as establishing the identity, whereabouts and activities of 
persons suspected of involving in corrupt activities; providing information on the 
movement of proceeds of crime or property that has been derived from the commission of 
offences listed in the UN Convention; and providing information requested for 
investigative purposes, as well as facilitating effective co-ordination between competent 
authorities.  There are also provisions on extradition.60  As to how far the inclusion of 
extradition will enable extradition in practice is open to scrutiny since SPs may enter 
reservations in respect of extradition.61  
                                                 
59 Article 15 deals with active and passive bribery of domestic public official; Article 21 deals with bribery 
in the private sector; and Article 23 deals with laundering of proceeds of crime.  
60 Article 44. 
61 See I. Cobain, T. Parfitt and N. Watt, ‘Yard’s poison murder investigators face huge extradition obstacle 
as they arrive in Moscow’, The Guardian, 5 December 2006. 
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 Mutual legal assistance is also covered extensively and can be requested in a 
number of matters such as the taking of statements, effective service of judicial 
documents, and executing searches and seizures as well as freezing.  It also lists the 
formalities to be followed in requesting mutual legal assistance and circumstances in 
which it may be refused.  The UN Convention expects SPs to establish a special body62 
dedicated to combating corruption.  The setting up of a specialized unit in management 
terms is attractive, since it creates a group of personnel with expert knowledge of the 
relevant techniques for combating and preventing corruption. 
2.3 Asset Recovery  
The most radical section in the UN Convention is a body of the provisions on asset 
recovery.  While conventions such as the AU Convention and the OAS Convention 
provide for seizure and freezing of assets they do not address the controversial and 
difficult issue of asset recovery.  The UN Convention is therefore unique in going beyond 
seizure and freezing of assets63 to include repatriation of assets obtained through corrupt 
activity.  The whole of Chapter V (Articles 51-59) is devoted to asset recovery and 
Article 51 provides that “the return of assets …is a fundamental principle64 of this 
Convention, and States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of the 
cooperation and assistance in this regard”.  Chapter V received the enthusiastic support of 
developing countries, many of whom have been gradually stripped of their national 
wealth by despotic regimes over time.65  Much has been said and reported about the 
                                                 
62 Articles 5 and 36. 
63 On freezing, seizure and confiscation see Article 31. 
64 However it seems that this phrase does not have legal consequences on the provisions contained in 
Chapter V. See UN Doc A/58/422/Add.1, 7 October 2003 at 8, available at http://www.unodc.org. 
65 See the Nyanga Declaration on the Recovery and Repatriation of Africa’s Wealth, 4 March 2001 
available at http://www.legacy.transparency.org; The Nairobi Declaration 7 April 2006 available 
http://www.globalpolicy.org )  
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excesses of the leaders and politicians of developing countries66 and the ‘illegal export’ of 
national wealth and their investments abroad in bonds, stocks and real estate.  In a few 
cases states have had some success in recovering at least part of the stolen wealth located 
in other jurisdictions.67 
Asset recovery however is beset with a number of problems.  Much of the illicit 
gains are likely to be located in developed countries, and laws in relation to freezing and 
confiscation orders are fairly complex and procedurally rigorous in these countries.  
Many of the developing countries, victims of ‘national asset escape’, lack the financial 
capacity and legal techniques and expertise required to engage in the investigation and 
prosecution for recovery of assets.  Recovery of ill-gotten assets largely depends on the 
seriousness and commitment with which international co-operation both at the 
investigative and legal level are carried out.  Developed countries also need to do a great 
deal in ensuring that they do not provide ‘safe havens’ to individuals engaged in corrupt 
activities.  That there is a political will to do this at least seemed to emerge from the G868 
countries’ summit held at St Petersburg in July 2006. 69  The Leaders of G8 have pledged 
that they “will work with all the international financial centres and our private sectors to 
deny safe haven to illicitly acquired assets by individuals engaged in high level 
corruption. … we reiterate our commitment to take concrete steps to ensure that financial 
markets are protected from criminal abuse, including bribery and corruption, by pressing 
all financial centres to attain and implement the highest international standards of 
                                                 
66 See A.D. Bontrager Unzicker, ‘From Corruption to Cooperation: Globalisation Brings a Multilateral 
Agreement Against Foreign Bribery’, 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2000), 655. 
67 For instance, the return of millions of dollars deposited by the Abacha military regime to Nigeria 
(http://www.ejpd.admin.ch); see also the Switzerland-Peruvian case, and the Marcos case 
(http://www.u4.no). 
68 Group of Eight. 
69 http://en.g8russia.ru.  
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transparency and exchange of information.”70 While such public expressions impart a 
level of confidence the important question is whether it will make a real difference on the 
ground.  In the present climate, it may make a difference, since there is a perceived 
degree of association between corruption and a threat to security.71  With the current 
concerns about security, there is reason to believe that movement of funds including 
corruptly obtained funds across jurisdictions through financial institutions will be under 
close scrutiny. 
 The language of Chapter V leans towards the mandatory and Article 52 focuses 
on the prevention and detection of transfers of proceeds of crime.  It requires SPs to take 
steps in accordance with its domestic law to ensure that financial institutions in their 
countries identify customers and the beneficial owners of funds deposited into high value 
accounts.  Without doubt, this will introduce a further layer of bureaucracy in some 
countries.  And more so in developing countries where many of the banks are state-
owned and are already subject to burdensome bureaucracy and where the decision-
making at times is dispersed across different sections of the bank. While measures in 
relation to identification are important, it may have the opposite unintended effect.  After 
all, is it not excessive bureaucracy that provides the breeding ground for corrupt activities 
in developing countries?  It seems the UN Convention in its attempt to tackle grand 
corruption unwittingly may be creating an opportunity for petty corruption and 
harassment of customers by lowly paid bank staff.  
                                                 
70 See Donnelly, C ‘Rethinking Security’, 48(3) NATO Review (2000), 32. Web edition is also available at 
http://www.nato.int. According to Donnelly, “corruption is a security threat in its own right, as well a 
contributory factor to governmental failings … [It] is the single most serious threat to the viability of 
several countries ….”(at 32.) 
71 It seems national security may be used as a tool to stop corruption related investigations! See ‘National 
Interests Halts Arms Corruption Inquiry’ The Guardian 15 December 2006. 
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Article 52 further requires “enhanced scrutiny of accounts sought or maintained by 
or on behalf of individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with public functions and 
their family members and close associates.”  The intention here is one of detection but it 
is questionable whether this will work in practice in countries where corruption is 
endemic.  The UN Convention addresses corruption in specific contexts, namely private 
to public and private to private.  It does not address corruption within the public sector as 
between departments, for instance, where the Ministry of Finance requests a state-owned 
bank to relax scrutiny of the bank account of one of their civil servants.  While nothing is 
openly agreed, there may be an expectation that compliance with the request may result 
in favourable treatment when it comes to allocation of resources to state-owned banks. 
Moreover, Article 52 also addresses the issue of introducing financial disclosure 
schemes for public officials including a declaration of any interest in a financial account 
in a foreign country.  It is expected that SPs will introduce sanctions for non-compliance 
with these provisions.  
 Articles 53 - 57 deal with issues relating to confiscation, seizure, international co-
operation and mutual assistance for the purposes of confiscation and the return and 
disposal of such assets.  Article 53 is an important provision and requires SPs to take 
measures that will permit another state to initiate civil action in its courts to establish title 
to or ownership of property acquired through corrupt activities. 
As a preventive and combating measure, Article 58, in a mandatory tone, requires 
SPs to establish a financial intelligence unit to be responsible for receiving, analyzing and 
disseminating to the competent authorities reports of spurious financial transactions.  In 
theory, it sounds attractive to have a specially-dedicated unit since it has the potential to 
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increase the chances for detection and subsequent prosecution.  However, the question is 
how it will work in practice.  Most of the countries that have ratified the UN Convention 
fall within the group of developing and least developed countries.  Many of them are 
resource strapped and currently engaged in a variety of local issues ranging from civil 
unrest, sectarian conflict, high levels of illiteracy, and poverty to high incidence of 
malaria, TB and AIDS amongst their citizens.  In real terms, intelligence units require 
funds, high levels of staffing and access to modern investigation techniques such as 
sophisticated information technology that has the potential to compile, hold and access 
databases, and relate information held in these databases in an effective manner for the 
purposes of analysis.  Lacking funds and skills it is highly debatable whether these 
countries can cope with the requirements of Article 52.  Funds and skills training are 
essential followed by further financial injection for sustaining such units.  International 
agencies such as the World Bank may be a source of finance but would it be a realistic 
expectation that they will be provide sustained support for such activities?  Various 
agencies, such as the UNODC72and the FATF73), have organized workshops on asset 
recovery.  Without extensive details and statistics, however, it is unclear how far these 
have resulted in initiation of actions and requests for cross-border co-operation.  The UN 
Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention on Corruption 
scheduled to take place in Amman during 10-14 December 2006 will consider the issue 
of asset recovery and the background paper suggests that they will seek to create a centre 
of expertise, thus forming the backbone of expertise for activities conducted under the 
                                                 
72 They have produced a guidance document for implementation of the UN Convention. See Legislative 
Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption available at 
http://www.unodc.org.  
73 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering which has produced Forty Recommendations to 
Counter Money Laundering available at http://www.fatf.gafi.org.    
Indira Carr                                             MJIEL Vol 3 Issue 3 2006 
 
 34
five pillars described as: (1) needs assessment; (2) legal advisory services; (3) strategic 
planning and case-management support; (4) capacity-building and training, and (5) 
partnership-building and information-sharing.  As the background paper correctly 
observes, “asset recovery may become the litmus test of the effectiveness of the 
Convention as a practical tool for fighting corruption.  Building a comprehensive 
programme should be one of the top priorities of the Conference of the States Parties.  
That entails careful thinking about the components of such a programme and a readiness 
to make the necessary resources available.”74  But where are these resources going to 
come from?  One possible way to move this forward would be to explore the possibility 
of a public-private partnership where multinationals and international financial 
institutions could provide the technology and other resources as part of their corporate 
social responsibility agenda.75   
2.4 Sanctions  
One would expect a convention that creates a long list of corruption and corruption-
related offences to provide an equally exhaustive list of sanctions.  Other than stating that 
the level of sanctions should take into account the gravity of the offence,76 the UN 
Convention is silent on the type of sanctions, be it fines or loss of liberty to be used.  Its 
                                                 
74 CAC/COSP/2006/6 - Item 2 of the Provisional Agenda (CAC/COSP/2006/1) Consideration of ways and 
means to achieve the objectives of the Conference of the States Parties in accordance with Article 63, 
paragraphs 1 and 4-7, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, at 8.  
75 The UN in 2004 added ‘the promotion and adoption of initiatives to counter all forms of corruption, 
including extortion and bribery’ as Principle 10 in its Global Compact, thus bringing corruption within the 
fold of corporate social responsibility. The Global Compact is a network to support the participation of the 
private sector and other social actors to advance responsible corporate citizenship and universal social and 
environmental standards. 
76 Article 30(1). 
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approach is similar to those other conventions that have included provisions on 
sanctions.77 
Gravity is a complex concept in this context and can be construed in a number of 
ways, for instance, the gravity of the act itself or the gravity of the consequences that 
flow from the act.  The following illustrations will help clarifying the point. 
(1) O, a public official, accepts a bribe of $100,000 from a drugs company (C) for 
planning permission to build a much needed hospital in a remote part of the 
country.  C is well known internationally for using hospital patients for testing 
new drugs without obtaining consent from them.  Indeed, C has recently been 
prosecuted in a neighbouring country for experimenting on unknowing hospital 
patients. 
(2) O takes a bribe of $150,000 from a well known philanthropist (P) to build a much 
needed hospital in a remote part of the country. 
(3) O accepts a bribe of $10 from an individual (I), for a telephone connection. 
In all of the above situations, O has committed the offence as set out in Article 15 and all 
the acts can be said to be grave since they are criminal offences.  Does this mean that O is 
to be treated in the same manner in all of those cases when it comes to sanctions; or is the 
value of the bribe relevant?  If the value is relevant, then (2), on the gravity scale, comes 
out as the highest compared with (1) and (3).  However, if consequences are important, 
then (1) is extremely serious due to the concern on drug testing on unknowing patients. 
Leaving the interpretation of gravity to SPs will, no doubt, undermine the 
harmonisation of laws on corruption intended by the Convention.  To some extent, the 
reluctance on part of the Convention to enter the arena of criminal justice is 
                                                 
77 See for example, the OECD Convention, and the COE Convention as set out in Table I. 
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understandable.  Sentencing policies and guidelines vary across jurisdictions.  And it 
would have been foolhardy even to attempt to harmonise laws in this area, since it would 
have affected the ‘saleability’ of the convention.  
Investigation and prosecution of public officials poses special problems since public 
officials in most jurisdictions enjoy immunities that protect them from investigation and 
prosecution.  Article 30(2) addresses the issue of immunities in discretionary language 
which suggests the matter is to be left to the SPs even though it states that there should be 
“an appropriate balance between any immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to 
its public official for the performance of their functions and the possibility, when 
necessary, of effectively investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating offences established 
in accordance with this Convention”.  That domestic law is prioritized is again reiterated 
in Article 30(9) which states that “[n]othing contained in this Convention shall affect the 
principle that the description of the offences established in accordance with this 
Convention and of the applicable legal defences or other legal principles controlling the 
lawfulness of conduct is reserved to the domestic law of a State Party and that such 
offences shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with that law”.  This means that 
many of the offences created may not have the intended effect if immunities and 
privileges are raised as a defence.  If the UN Convention is to have a real impact, it is 
important that SPs consider the possibility of prosecuting an official once he has left 
office.  
2.5 Implementation 
As stated earlier, the success of a convention is to be measured not just by the number of 
ratifications but also its effective implementation.  Chapter VIII deals with issues relating 
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to implementation and their review.  According to Article 63, the review of the UN 
Convention is to be carried out through a Conference of the States Parties to the 
Convention.  Such a Conference is to take place in December 2006.  The Background 
Paper78 on implementation suggests that the implementation review process may start 
with an initial self-assessment on the part of the SPs to identify the weaknesses, strengths 
and vulnerabilities in their systems with a view to reviewing these further and providing 
suitable help and guidance in meeting specific goals as identified. 
That follow-up action is important after ratification is recognized by most of the 
anti-corruption conventions.79  There are available follow-up models that can provide 
some useful insights to how this mechanism can be fine tuned.  The model adopted for 
the OECD Convention appears to be working quite well.  The OECD’s model80 of 
systematic monitoring provides a useful framework.  The monitoring consists of two 
phases.  Phase I assesses the conformity of a State Party’s anti-bribery laws with the 
OECD Convention.  In Phase II, there is a one-week long on-site meeting with actors 
from a variety of backgrounds: the government, trade councils, development agencies, 
businesses, and civil society.  A number of Phase II reports have been published. 81  
These reports are extremely detailed and exhaustive.  They exhibit the rigour with which 
the teams have followed up the issue of implementation of the OECD Convention 
through amendments to national legislations, correlating the success rate with statistical 
data gathered by criminal agencies, public awareness, sanctions, jurisdiction and 
                                                 
78 CAC/COSP/2006/5 15 November 2006. 
79 See Table I. 
80 Article 12 of the OECD Convention contains a provision on monitoring and follow-up and according to 
Article 12 the Parties are required to co-operate in “carrying out a programme of systematic follow-up to 
monitor and promote the full implementation” [of the OECD Convention] and this is to be done in the 
“framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions …”. 
81 These Reports are available on the OECD website http://www.oecd.org. For instance, the Report on 
Sweden was adopted on 21 September  2005 and that on Bulgaria on 6 June  2003. 
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international co-operation.  The examination of the legislation and other mechanisms for 
enforcing the legislation are thorough and recommendations robust as the reports 
exhibit.82  Of course, in making recommendations, there is always the danger that SPs fail 
to act on them.  A subsequent meeting with the State actors would be one way to ensure 
that the recommendations have an impact.  
2.6 Popularity Assessed 
So far, the author has elaborated the main aspects of the UN Convention and highlighted 
both the innovative and the problematic provisions of the Convention.  As stated in the 
Introduction, this Convention has proved to be a popular choice, the evidence being the 
number of ratifications it has received especially from developing countries.  This 
popularity is attributable to the following features of the Convention:   
• It is comprehensive, since it includes corruption in private to public sector and 
public to public sector contexts.  Its comprehensiveness reaches beyond the 
creation of offences to cover aspects of investigation.  Of course, it could have 
done more by dealing with corruption in the political sector, especially funding of 
political parties as well as corruption in public sector to public sector that does not 
involve personal advantage.  In practical terms, however, this would have made 
the progress of the Convention extremely arduous, since it would have raised 
issues that many countries would have found very sensitive.  
                                                 
82 Despite expectations, for example, that Sweden would have a sophisticated system for preventing and 
combating corruption, the Report recommends that awareness of the offence of bribery be raised amongst 
companies, and the Export Credit Guarantees Board, and encourages the Swedish defence industry to 
develop strong anti-corruption measures. Recommendations are also made in respect of amendments to 
their Anti-Corruption Regulation of 2001 and effective prosecution and sanctioning of bribery of foreign 
public officials. 
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• It is flexible, since the adoption of mandatory and discretionary language in 
respect of offences means that countries have the option to tailor their legislation 
according to their legal principles.  Its flexibility is attractive to developing 
countries that normally view legal harmonisation as a manifestation of legal 
imperialism.  
• It is innovative, since it includes a chapter on “Asset Recovery”.  The inclusion of 
this chapter was enthusiastically greeted during negotiations by developing 
nations that at some time have experienced the negative impact of national asset 
stripping by their leaders.  Many of these countries have been unable to utilise 
available mechanisms to good effect.  The introduction of this controversial topic 
into an anti-corruption convention with follow-up mechanisms of help and co-
operation with investigation and legal assistance may have singularly contributed 
to its popularity.  If the asset recovery mechanisms put in place by the UN 
Convention turn out to be workable in practice, this will be an applaudable 
contribution of the UN Convention. 
• It has the potential to satisfy donor demands.  Many of the donor agencies, such as 
the World Bank, the African Development Bank, require donee countries to have 
anti-corruption legislation in place as a condition for receiving loans.  Ratification 
of the UN Convention by a donee country is likely to be seen as satisfying those 
demands by the donors.  Since many developing countries have ratified this 
Convention, there is a strong reason for saying that this may be the case. 
• It is also progressive.  As the next Part exhibits, it has given thought to putting in 
place measures that enhance transparency and integrity.   
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• It  sees a greater role for citizen participation not only in the decision making 
processes within a State but also in adopting a non-tolerant attitude towards 
corrupt behaviour.  
3. Criminal Law, its Limitations and Preventive Measures  
The creation of offences along with tough sanctions is normally expected to function as 
an effective deterrent.  While this may be the case to some extent it would be an over-
optimistic expectation on part of policy makers that criminal legislation has the intended 
effect on human behaviour.  Experience also shows otherwise.  Criminal law, in most 
countries, creates a wide variety of offences along with tough sanctions.  They cover a 
wide spectrum ranging from offences against the person and property to fraud.  Existence 
of these offences by no means eradicates or reduces violent behaviour or fraudulent 
activities in society.  To curb the criminal activity, it is important to have other 
mechanisms in place that will work effectively alongside criminal law.  In respect of 
corruption, the UN Convention takes a progressive attitude by requiring SPs to put in 
place, maintain, and co-ordinate effective anti-corruption policies.  The stance it adopts is 
of a holistic nature and it expects the engagement of the public sector, the private sector, 
the financial sector, and the judiciary in the prevention of corruption.  Transparency, 
integrity and accountability are the principles it projects in the mandatory requirements 
imposed on SPs. 
Taking public sector first, Article 7(a) advocates adoption of procedures in the 
hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants, the obvious aim is to reduce 
the incidence of cronyism and nepotism prevalent in the appointment and promotion of 
public officials.  A number of studies on the causes of corruption have cited low wages as 
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a reason for the high incidence of corruption in the public sector.  This may be true 
certainly at the lower levels of public sector employment.  With this in sight, a provision 
requiring SPs to promote adequate remuneration subject to their levels of economic 
development is also included.83  Whether this will see a significant rise in wages is 
debatable since many of the developing countries do not have the public funds to meet 
the wage demands.  This shortfall is partly attributable in many cases to evasion of taxes 
on the part of high income groups and companies.  Unless these areas are tightened it 
may take some time for developing countries to meet this requirement.   
The public sector measures are further strengthened by Article 8 through the 
establishment of codes of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper performance of 
public functions.  Many countries probably have such codes of conduct in place. How 
seriously these are followed is another matter.  Monitoring and introduction of internal 
disciplinary actions may be one way of ensuring compliance, and in a discretionary tone, 
Article 8(6) suggests that SPs consider disciplinary and other measures for those who 
violate the standards or codes of conduct.  
Specific provisions on the measures to be taken in respect of activities such as 
public procurement and management of public finances, which are known to present 
fertile opportunities for corrupt activities, are also included.  Article 9 indicates the steps 
that SPs need to adopt to ensure transparency and objectivity in public procurement 
contracts, thus limiting the scope for corrupt activities.  SPs are expected to ensure that 
information about tenders is publicly distributed, and that the conditions of participation 
and criteria for selection are clear.  Where rules of procedure are not followed, the 
provisions also make room for an effective system of appeal.  
                                                 
83 Article 7(c).  
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Any anti-corruption drive needs to ensure that the judiciary and prosecution 
services are not corrupted.  Mindful of the problem of corruption in these sectors in many 
countries84 the UN Convention requires SPs to take measures to strengthen the integrity 
of and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of these services.85  It 
suggests once again codes of conduct in this context, but these are likely to work only if 
effective measures for their monitoring are put in place. 
Moving on to the private sector, anti-corruption measures are addressed through 
enhanced accounting and auditing standards along with effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive civil, administrative and criminal penalties for failure to comply.  Codes of 
conduct are also seen as a means of strengthening the integrity and proper performance of 
business activities by the actors in the private sector.86  Moreover, as in the OECD 
Convention  SPs are required to disallow tax deductibility of expenses that constitute 
bribes as well as other expenses incurred in furtherance of corrupt conduct. 
Since financial institutions play a major role in depositing and transferring illicitly 
obtained funds across borders Article 14 requires SPs to take adequate measures to 
prevent money laundering by instituting a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory 
regime for banks and other financial institutions, including the keeping of meticulous 
records and the taking of adequate measures to check customer identification and 
reporting suspicious transactions.  Since many money transfers are carried out 
electronically where the identity of the originator may not always be clear, the UN 
                                                 
84 On corruption in the judiciary, see for instance, ‘Tanzania: Corruption in the Police, Judiciary, Revenue 
and Land Services’ available at http://www.ciet.org.   
85 Article 11. 
86 Article 12. 
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Convention requires that such information should be clearly included and maintained 
through the payment chain. 
All of the above preventive measures make a constructive and important 
contribution to combating corruption.  However, there is one major weakness.  While 
adoption of codes of conduct is easy, integrity can be assured only if they are followed 
assiduously.  Without effective monitoring, it remains another set of rules to be broken 
with impunity, especially in developing countries that lack resources.  Against this 
potentially gloomy backdrop, the UN Convention seems to have taken the right approach 
by requiring SPs to bring in other stakeholders, such as citizens, community-based 
organisations, non-governmental organisations and activists, within the preventive 
measures.  The UN sees a greater role for the public in the decision-making processes 
within a State and for the State to put in place measures for greater access to information.   
It even goes as far as indicating that the detrimental effects of corruption and non-
tolerance of corruption should be part of the school and university curricula.87  Once 
again, it is possible to criticize this as nothing more than an expression of ideals, since 
many of the countries that have ratified the UN Convention suffer from high rates of 
illiteracy.  And in countries that lack a democratic structure, it is unlikely that they will 
adopt the trappings of democracy such as access to information and citizen participation 
in decision-making.  A nihilistic picture can be painted of any convention.  However, 
what has to be kept in mind is that it will take time to introduce changes, and the UN 
Convention is not meant to be a quick-fix solution to the problem that has plagued 
humanity for centuries. 
 
                                                 
87 Article 13. 
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Conclusion 
Will the UN Convention make a difference to millions of people around the world who 
are living below the poverty line?  The coming into force of an international convention 
and the numbers of ratification are a clear sign that the international community of 
policymakers and lawmakers recognize the impact of corruption on poverty and the need 
to find a solution.  This recognition is important, but a solution through legal regulation 
of itself is insufficient in achieving the objective of reducing corruption and having an 
impact on poverty globally.  Legal regulation is always prone to enforcement deficit for a 
number of reasons ranging from lack of investigative expertise and mutual co-operation 
to political apathy.  Without the political will of SPs and the willingness of civil society 
to take ownership of the problem, the UN Convention will remain just an interesting 
attempt to promote a global solution to a global problem.  There are many elements in the 
UN Convention that can be used constructively in the fight against corruption, such as the 
recommendations in respect of public education, and the role of stakeholders such as civil 
society and non-governmental organisations.  However, it is the willingness and 
enthusiastic participation of the stakeholders that would make a real difference to the 
quality of life of millions of people round the world.  Even so, the UN Convention is an 
important catalyst in waking up a slumbering world.   
